

## SLIDE 1

# **European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World.** **(A Policing Perspective).**

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## **INTRODUCTION**

Thank you for opportunity to once again present to your seminar. The last being in 2006 after my return from 15 months in Iraq as UK Chief Police Advisor. I subsequently spent 2 years until December 2008 as Head of Mission, EUPOL COPPS in Ramallah and Jerusalem

## SLIDE 2

Maureen BROWN, from CPCC (Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability) in Brussels, who should have given this presentation would give an upbeat view of the European, particularly UK contribution. Whilst falling short of Marc Anthony - *'I come not to praise Caesar but to bury him'* – I would seek to be controversial and challenging, particularly since the current economic climate dictates that we must get more focus and better value for money. We should, could and can do things better.

You will note that I have added 'A Policing Perspective' to the title. I would seek to concentrate on the contribution of this area to Security in a changing world. Apart from my background as police officer,

WHY?

### SLIDE 3

Let me start with an anecdote. In early 2005 I was moving through Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) to the Green Zone accompanied by my Staff Officer and Deputy. We were all in clearly marked UK Police related Uniform. A young American Marine came over and said – ‘Its really good to see you Brit Police here. As soon as you get things sorted we can all go home’. Some testament! No pressure there then.

He was right. But he was wrong.

Right - A functioning, effective, efficient police service responsible to a Civil Ministry and accountable to an independent Criminal Justice system is a sign of a democratic state. It must be the ‘endgame’ of our international development. Reconstruction etc all follows good security, not just military but from crime, corruption and abuse. These are policing NOT military functions.

Wrong – firstly, that the creation of such an institution was both achievable in the middle of at best counter insurgency or ‘war fighting’ and secondly achievable within a short time span.

This dilemma is compounded by the statement (discussed regularly with Gen Keith Dayton and other US Senior Staff in Jerusalem in 2007-8). Are we (Policing Advisors) there to ‘develop police for a

democratic state or to create a democratic state'. If you think carefully, there is a fine distinction, relevant certainly to Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan if not most of the EU/UN Missions in the world.

In Iraq from the end of hostilities in 2003 until only recently the priority was on the latter ie creating a state - understandable considering the level of insurgency and fatalities. The Iraqi Police were for long seen as an adjunct to the Coalition and Iraqi Military – the creation of 135k officers (from scratch). At best a paramilitary unit, although I think the concept of Gendarmerie and Carabinieri was misunderstood, at worst, like the Special Police Commandos, quasi 'unaccountable' police 'strong men'. I know my UK Military colleagues in Basra 'loved' the Italian Carabinieri. I would like to believe it was for their professional ability and self supporting capability BUT suspect it may be for the immaculate black uniforms designed by Armani, Gucci combat boots and a silk scarf to die for!!.

That dilemma, 'for' or 'create' compounded police development in Iraq (and I believe there are parallels in Afghanistan).

A second key error is what I would call 'doctrinal arrogance'. A belief that the policing structures of Europe and America are applicable, appropriate and immediately transferrable throughout the Middle East into an Arab, Moslem culture. Yes, there has to be a minimum 'international acceptable level', particularly in respect of human rights and corruption, as a starting point. But should we immediately aim for unattainable perfection (the Olympic level), often at best ignoring local culture and tradition, (and more important, reality). Are our own police services attaining those levels of expectation? Are our politicians (the word 'expenses' comes to mind). The US Policing

System (over 23000 individual law enforcement agencies) is I believe not exportable from the US mainland (this didn't stop the creation in Iraq of a Highway Patrol and quasi FBI!!) European and UN Missions have the opportunity of mixing different policing and justice systems – a 'menu' from which to select appropriate policing training (and importantly Criminal Justice options). For example the UK adversarial justice concept is not broadly applicable in the Middle East. The European 'inquisitorial' system has far greater relevance.

Policing Doctrine is a key ingredient for future success, both short and long term. Northern Ireland (1969-97) WAS NOT Iraq or Afghanistan. Analogies and 'Lessons Learned' need to be carefully thought out. One of the key successes to me was, what is almost unique to the UK – MACP – 'Military Aid to Civil Power. This does not exist in the US (Posse Comitatus Act) or much of the world. Similarly the established UK role of 'Police Primacy', that is police take the lead in dealing with community up to counter terrorism. Over this concept of I have had many arguments with 'The Generals' (UK and US). 'Police Primacy' DOES NOT mean the Police are better, superior or, in charge. Simply that Police should be the focus of interaction with the community and the criminal justice system, SUPPORTED by the military when required. As a young RUC officer in 1970's West Belfast I patrolled with a police colleague dealing with the public and offences, warrants etc. A military section provided cover and logistic support (helicopters etc). I did my role for which I was trained, the military did there's. Too often I have seen soldiers trying to be police and vice versa. It is not productive. It does not work.

I saw this particularly in Iraq. The Coalition Military concentrated on developing the Iraqi Army as a 'stand alone' resource, with separate barracks, command structures etc. The Iraqi MOD and military in

general was the subject of vast investment, the Iraqi MOI and police comparably less before I departed in mid 2006. The Iraqi Police were given 8 weeks basic training and sent to poorly equipped and resourced old police stations. When attacked by superior armed and trained Former Regime Elements they ran. I thought this probably a sensible option. I must concede that there was an increase on co-ordination through Joint Ops Rooms (TCG's – another UK lesson learned from Northern Ireland.) But the future MUST be greater co-ordination and operational integration between military and police. The use of joint facilities. In South Armagh, Northern Ireland in a hostile 'policing environment' the police operated from WITHIN secure military bases. Joint Military-Police patrols were the norm with the aim of reducing military involvement as police capabilities expanded. This must be an exportable doctrine in conflict situations.

Why the concentration on military training – was this a conscious decision OR simply that the 'masters' in the Coalition were military?

Yes to the latter – but this was not the military's fault. To start with they were fighting an insurgency but also the original Bremer Plan in 2003 (it might have been good to have a Policing Plan before the invasion') envisaged 5000 plus international police trainers. Never attained – maximum 500 plus American (contractors DynCorp) – 120 UK (including 80 Armorgroup contractors).

Why? Another issue that will continue to be central for international deployments – 'Duty of Care'. Police officers operate under different risk assessment than military (I note with interest the recent UK Human Rights decision applicable to the Military last week). The culture is based on 'Risk Averse' NOT as I believe is necessary 'Risk Aware'. For example, many of the larger UK Police Forces would not

allow officers to be seconded to Iraq. One cannot deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan and expect to act as if policing the streets of Windsor.

In Iraq this resulted in growing friction between the Military and Police Advisors. Particularly of scarce military resources diverted to support police advisors. A particular concern in a hostile environment where military activity is increasingly aimed at self defence and combat operations. In early 2005 I could regularly travel from the British Consulate (Base) in Basra to the City PHQ and Police Stations in an armoured 4 x 4 with a Control Risk bodyguard. When I left in mid 2006 I could only travel into Basra in a helicopter and visit the Chief of Police (infrequently) in a convoy of Warrior Armoured Vehicles. Add to this 'generous leave arrangements', the UK Military increasingly questioned the value of civilian Police advisors. An old 'adversary' of mine, General RILEY, referred to '*Hampshire Beat bobbies (a dig at me) and ex-RUC officers more interested in traffic policing and Human Rights.*' I'm not sure that was my recollection of the RUC!! The finest counter terrorist police force in the world.

On departing from Baghdad in 2006 the US were deploying a Military Police Brigade to train police! Necessity and reality increasingly overcoming a long term aim. One is reminded of the analogy '***when you're up to your neck in alligators it's hard to remember you're there to drain the swamp***'.

It is not a totally bleak situation. I had greater success in Palestine where Gen Keith Dayton acknowledged the role of 'police primacy' and was training military units as 'police support'. There was still however an issue of local Palestinian culture. All local commanders, often junior in rank or service were military. As a senior Palestinian

colleague explained – the military represent ‘the state’, police are civilians. This is a culture we must seek to overcome. It won’t be easy!!

There is also, I believe, a complete misunderstanding of the requirements and role of training police. Soldiers are recruited, sent to barracks where they are trained in isolation from the community, deployed in structured and commanded groups. Police officers undergo basic training, deploy to local stations where they live in the community they police. Training takes place ‘on the job’, on the streets, often alone or in pairs, through contact with that community. To develop a police force in Iraq would realistically take 5-10 years (in a stable environment). The international community must acknowledge the long term requirements of police development.

One of the key lessons from developing police in conflict from Iraq and Palestine (and again Afghanistan) is the need to see policing as an integral part of a Criminal Justice system, in effect a continuum from police to prosecution, courts and prison. To develop one part to the detriment of another is counter-productive. This clearly requires greater co-ordination of international effort. This was recognised by the EU in Palestine – the Criminal Justice and Prison capacity expanding from 1 to 20 advisors and including defence solicitors and court management. The importance of developing civil ministries is another key component.

In addition to adopting the right police training doctrine, it is essential to deploy the right officers with the requisite skills. The UK has through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Home Office and ACPO done much in recent years to ensure the development and preparation of officers deploying overseas. At the risk of offending some of my previous colleagues I do not believe those skills include senior officers from Durham and Gwent in ‘conflict environments’. I

also do not believe that 'serving officers' necessarily provide the best pool. **As a retired officer with a family to feed I would say that wouldn't !!** I have already alluded to the issue of 'duty of care'. The UK has been fortunate in the past few years with the availability of recently retired RUC officers (2000 onwards following the Patton Recommendations and morphing into the Police Service for Northern Ireland). I note this is something the EU has taken cognisance of – a number of senior EU posts are held by ex-RUC – Paul Kernaghan, my successor as Head of EUPOL COPPS in Palestine, Steven White and Mark Crozier in EUJUSTLEX and Ken Deane Head of Operations in CPCC in Brussels. Retired officers will be, from 2010 an important component of Canadian plans.

#### SLIDE 4

I also see little value in deploying seconded officers for periods of 6 months. In my experience even 12 months is questionable in terms of actual time on the ground (learning and taking forward concepts etc). This again was (and is) a contentious issue with both US and UK Military.

The availability of seconded UK officers, particularly at a skilled senior level is, and will continue to be, a problem. International policing is not a performance measure for a Chief Constable. Nor for the local community or Police Authority. I would strongly urge the greater creation of a cadre of retired officers. The UK has a unique 'pool' as most retire after 30 years, sometimes in their early to mid 50's. NOT SO in Europe where most are required to serve to 60 or 65.

#### SLIDE 5

The Right Doctrine, the Right People with the Right skills. I strongly support the use of EU and UN Missions as the appropriate 'support

mechanism'. There is a great mixture of specialist skills. In Palestine, for example, I used French CRS Officers to lead on training 1000 Public Order (Special Police) and Czech Officers skilled in Scene Examination. In Iraq the UK had the lead in Criminal Intelligence and Forensic Training. There is a future opportunity for national niche development of police development and training including community policing and leadership training.

I started this presentation discussing financial implications. I will conclude with it. Funding is essential not only for providing real resources to support training and infrastructure development BUT also for the leverage it provides. It should be remembered that in most theatres we operate as advisors WITHOUT executive powers. In both Iraq and Palestine I had no powers to order a police officer, let alone the Chief of Police, to do any action. It is no point training officers in the use of public order tactics if there is no funding for shields, batons, helmets, overalls etc.

Funding should be targeted at specific need areas and co-ordinated on the ground. In June 2008 the International Community gathered in Berlin to pledge over 240 million dollars to support the development and training of Palestinian Police and CJS. It was agreed that this would be co-ordinated by EUPOL COPPS with the Palestinian Authority. Good until some countries, for clearly political reasons, started bi-lateral projects, often not those identified as immediate priorities. This was at best wasteful.

Funding cannot be underestimated. Our US colleagues, who feel they bear much of the costs, would strongly agree. UK lead on criminal intelligence was challenged by a US General in Baghdad. It was explained by him - 'Colin we know the Brits have the right skills to

lead BUT 90% of the casualties in Iraq and 98% of the money is US'. There is not going to be a UK lead!"

In conclusion. We need to engage in international police development. We need to fund it appropriately on a long term basis (less for the MOD?). We need appropriate number of skilled officers, with the background and ability to work alongside military colleagues, UK and international, (AS EQUALS). **SLIDE 6** We need to make more and better use of retired officers. Encourage seconded deployments through good assessment and feedback to Chief Constables on skills learned and performance. We need a doctrine based on the reality (culture etc) of deployments not outmoded UK policing doctrine. We need to seek niche areas – intelligence, forensic, community, leadership training where we can make a real, not token contribution.

Why do we need to engage in international police development. I started with an anecdote. I will finish with one.

In early 2005 in my movements from Basra Airport into the city my route invariably took me past a central crossroads. This was the location for young 'hawkers' to try to sell paper tissues, gum, bananas etc. I noted one young boy. About 10 years of age, poorly dressed. Part of a large family who had no schooling, no future. I would earn more in one month than he probably in his life. Yet he was smiling. He was smiling, always happy. It is for his future that we need to develop stable policing structures that will encourage economic development and progress. Whatever the cost we must not fail.

**SLIDE 7**

Thank You.

